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2024-08-29 18:17:47 UTC
In this article, Stockemer and Normandin test whether recent developments in
the populist radical right¢s messaging, such as the strategic introduction of
gender equality in these parties¢ political discourse and their evolution
towards economic chauvinism, has changed women¢s and men¢s propensity to vote
for the populist radical right. Using data from the eighth wave of the
European Social Survey (ESS), the authors find that two traditional
explanations for the gender gap in voting for the populist radical right have
lost their explanatory power. First, their results indicate that the
ideological moderation hypothesis no longer applies; that is, anti-
immigration sentiment and a rightist ideology are currently as much of a
reason to cast their ballot for the populist radical right for female voters
as they are for male voters. Second, they no longer find support that
economic dissatisfaction is a stronger driver for men than for women to vote
for the populist radical right. Rather, their results indicate the contrary.
In addition, they find that education is more of a bulwark against supporting
the populist radical right for women. Finally, their results illustrate that
older men are more likely to vote for the populist radical right than older
women.
i dont see anything about men beating their wives, ugly or not.the populist radical right¢s messaging, such as the strategic introduction of
gender equality in these parties¢ political discourse and their evolution
towards economic chauvinism, has changed women¢s and men¢s propensity to vote
for the populist radical right. Using data from the eighth wave of the
European Social Survey (ESS), the authors find that two traditional
explanations for the gender gap in voting for the populist radical right have
lost their explanatory power. First, their results indicate that the
ideological moderation hypothesis no longer applies; that is, anti-
immigration sentiment and a rightist ideology are currently as much of a
reason to cast their ballot for the populist radical right for female voters
as they are for male voters. Second, they no longer find support that
economic dissatisfaction is a stronger driver for men than for women to vote
for the populist radical right. Rather, their results indicate the contrary.
In addition, they find that education is more of a bulwark against supporting
the populist radical right for women. Finally, their results illustrate that
older men are more likely to vote for the populist radical right than older
women.
element of the populist right-wing agenda.
i visited alt.religion.islam, but for a violently proselytizing
religion, there seems to be no one there. it is ridiculous the
double standard being bestowed upon islam.